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estate and they must be a disinterested person.5 There are exceptions to the rule, such as 
representations involving potential conflicts of interest and the use of independent conflicts 
counsel to overcome such conflicts. These determinations are often made on a case by case basis. 
Recently, in In re WM Distribution, a bankruptcy court in New Mexico held that a firm 
was unable to represent two related debtors in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding because: (1) 
the two debtor companies had a close working relationship, and (2) although the debtor 
companies were not mutually owned, the majority shareholders of each company were on 
opposite sides of a couple going through a divorce.6 The court held that the entanglement of 
these two companies were so severe that there were numerous actual conflicts of interest present 
requiring the disqualification of counsel from representing both parties in the action.7 
Furthermore, the court held that the use of conflicts counsel was not an appropriate remedy for 
these conflicts because the adverse interests involved were “central to their respective 
reorganization efforts.”8  
Bankruptcy is a valuable method of relief for debtors, especially for debtors such as 
business’ that wish to reorganize and continue on with their companies. But with bankruptcy 
proceedings comes litigation costs.9 Such costs only add on to the debts of the parties filing.10 
Because the court is aware of such problems, often times the court will utilize methods to 
decrease these costs.11 One such method is the use of independent conflicts counsel.12 In order to 
                                                
5 See 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). 
6 See In re WM Distribution, 571 B.R. 866 (Bankr. D.N.M 2017). 
7 See id. at 874. 
8 Id. 
9 See Ronald D. Rotunda, Resolving Clients Conflicts by Hiring “Conflicts Counsel”, 62 
HASTINGS L. J. 677, 697 (2011). 
10 See id. 
11 See id. 
12 Id. 
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utilize the use of conflicts counsel, the question becomes: (1) when does a conflict of interest 
disqualify a law firm and its attorneys from representing a client, and (2) when does independent 
conflicts counsel become an available method to avoid such conflicts? 
This memorandum will explore the present question in a threefold approach. Part I 
discusses the requirements of an attorney to be employed as a professional person under 11 
U.S.C. § 327(a) and what qualifies as a “conflict of interest.” Part II analyzes the commonly used 
exception to this rule under 11 U.S.C. § 327(c). Part III concludes by analyzing the use of 
conflicts counsel and discussing situations in which its use is not a viable solution for such 
conflicts. 
I.  Counsel must hold no adverse interest and be disinterested to be employed as a 
Debtor’s professional. 
 
Under section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court “may employ one or more 
attorneys . . . that do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are 
disinterested persons, to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee’s duties under 
this title.”13 This statute lays out two general requirements that an attorney must meet in order to 
represent a party in a bankruptcy proceeding as its general counsel. First, they must not hold or 
represent an interest adverse to the estate. Second, they must be a disinterested person.  
“These statutory requirements–disinterestedness and no interest adverse to the estate–
serve the important policy of ensuring that all professionals appointed pursuant to section 327(a) 
tender undivided loyalty and provide untainted advice and assistance in furtherance of their 
fiduciary responsibilities.”14 The purpose of these requirements is to ensure effective assistance 
of counsel. An attorney must be able to offer candid advice to his or her client, they must have 
                                                
13 11 U.S.C § 327(a). 
14 Rome v. Braunstein, 19 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 1994). 
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his or her client’s best interest in mind at all times, and they must remain wholly loyal to his or 
her client above all other parties.15 These fiduciary obligations are not possible when a conflict of 
interest is present.  
There are two main categories of conflicts of interests: actual conflicts of interest and 
potential conflicts of interest.16 A potential conflict of interest is not a conflict that exists at the 
current time of the action; however, there is a possibility that a conflict may emerge during the 
course of the litigation.17 Although defined by the Model Rules, the Bankruptcy Code itself does 
not provide a definition for these differing types of conflicts.18 Because of this, one must look to 
case law to see how courts interpret the distinction between the two. As the court in In re BH & 
P, Inc. describes, “an actual conflict can be defined as an active competition between two 
interests, in which one interest can only be served at the expense of the other. A potential conflict 
can be defined as one in which the competition is presently dormant, but may become active if 
certain contingencies occur.”19  
Often times, determining what type of conflict is present in a litigation is made on a case 
by case basis.20 In these fact specific inquiries, courts often treat potential conflicts of interest as 
less severe than actual conflicts of interest and they are often given more leeway by the court; 
however, both types of conflicts can result in disqualification of counsel from a proceeding.21  
                                                
15 See id. 
16 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7  cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). 
17 See id. at cmt. 8. 
18 See In re BH & P, Inc., 103 B.R. 556, 563 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989). 
19 Id. 
20 See In re Dick Cepek, Inc., 339 B.R. 730, 740 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that “the inquiry into 
whether the professional . . . is impaired by a conflict of interest (actual or potential) is 
necessarily case– and fact-specific.”). 
21 See In re Schwindt, 2013 WL 321297, at *3 (Bankr. D.Colo. 2013) (explaining that 
disqualification of an attorney must result if there is an actual conflict of interest but is not 
mandatory with potential conflicts); In re Pillowtex, Inc., 304 F.3d 246, 251 (3d Cir. 2002) 
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II. Section 327(c) of the Bankruptcy code is a limited exception to the general rule of 
employment by professional persons. 
  
Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define what an “actual conflict of interest” is, 
courts often have broad authority, under section 327(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, to find such a 
conflict.22 Section 327(c) provides that “a person is not disqualified for employment under this 
section solely because of such person’s employment by or representation of a creditor, unless 
there is objection by another creditor or the United States trustee, in which case the court shall 
disapprove such employment if there is an actual conflict of interest.”23 This statute provides an 
exception to the general requirements under subsection (a) of this section. If counsel is 
disqualified solely because of their employment by or representation of a creditor in the action 
then there must be an actual conflict of interest present in order for the court to continue with the 
disqualification of the counsel. In other words, if there is a potential conflict of interest present 
because of the firm’s representation of both the debtor and a creditor, this would not result in 
disqualification. In order to have an actual conflict of interest and result in disqualification, there 
must be a substantial impediment on the firm’s representation, and thus an adverse affect on the 
firm’s implementation of its fiduciary duties to its clients.   
When the Bankruptcy Code first implemented section 327(c), this development in the law 
was extremely important because it shifted the focus of whether there was any conflict of interest 
                                                                                                                                                       
(stating that the Bankruptcy Code “imposes a per se disqualification . . . of any attorney who has 
an actual conflict of interest; [however,] the district court may within its discretion . . . disqualify 
an attorney who has a potential conflict of interest”).   
22 See In re 7677 E. Berry Ave. Assocs., L.P., 419 B.R. 833, 843 (Bankr. D. Colo 2009) 
(describing subsection (c) as being “commonly referred to as the ‘catch-all clause’”). 
23 11 U.S.C. § 327(c). 
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to whether there was an actual conflict of interest present in situations where counsel was 
disqualified solely because it represented a creditor.24  
Although counsel has tried to argue that the two sections can be read independently, the 
majority of courts have held that they must be read together.25 In other words, in order to meet 
the requirements of subsection (c), and thus have no actual conflicts of interest, counsel must still 
meet the requirements of (a), and thus have no interest adverse to the estate and be a disinterested 
person.26  
III. The use of independent conflicts counsel is not a viable solution when the adverse 
interests of the debtors are fundamental to reorganization efforts. 
 
The retention of conflicts counsel can be a viable solution in most cases.27 The idea is 
that if “matters in which general bankruptcy counsel's simultaneous representation of more than 
one debtor would pose a disqualifying conflict of interest are carved out of the scope of general 
                                                
24 See In re BH & P, Inc. at 1311 (holding that “[t]he existence of interdebtor claims is, therefore, 
no longer an automatic ground for disqualification of counsel . . . . Section 327 focuses the 
inquiry upon whether there is an actual conflict of interest.”); see also In re 7677 East Berry 
Ave. Assocs., L.P., 419 B.R. 833, 844 (Bankr. D.Colo. 2009) (holding that “[u]nder this 
provision, the existence of inter-debtor claims does not create a per se prohibition of counsel 
representing both estates.”); In re Project Orange Assocs., LLC, 431 B.R. 363, 371 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y 2010) (stating that “Congress has explicitly stated that a professional’s representation of 
a creditor in another case does not automatically disqualify it from being retained”). 
25 See Interwest Bus. Equip., Inc. v. United States Trustee (In re Interwest Bus. Equip.), 23 F.3d 
311, 316 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that “[t]he requirements of subsection (a) are threshold 
requirements to be met even if subsection (c) is implicated. Subsection (c) addresses the situation 
where dual representation of a creditor and debtor is the only reason advanced for 
disqualification and the professional is otherwise qualified.”); In re Cook, 223 B.R. 782, 790 
(10th Cir. 1998) (stating that “subsection (c) does not preempt the more basic requirements of 
subsection (a) . . . .”); In re Schwindt, 2013 WL 321297, at *7 (stating that “[s]ection 327(c) 
contains a limited exception to the general rule set forth in § 327(a) . . . . Therefore, the Court’s 
inquiry ends where the threshold requirements of § 327(a) are satisfied, unless § 327(c) . . . is 
implicated.”). 
26 See In re Interwest Business Equip., 23 F.3d at 316. 
27 See In re Project Orange, 431 B.R. at 375 (stating that “[i]n many cases, the employment of 
conflicts counsel to handle issues where general bankruptcy counsel has an adverse interest 
solves most questions regarding the retention of general bankruptcy counsel.”). 
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bankruptcy counsel's representation . . . and are assigned to separate independent counsel, no 
actual conflict of interest can arise.”28 The conflict matters would be outside the scope of the 
representation, and thus counsel would still be able to conduct this dual representation.29  
However, if the “areas in which the two companies have adverse interests are such that 
retention of independent conflicts counsel poses too great a risk that the [firm] would 
nevertheless be unable to give each debtor its undivided loyalty and provide . . .  untainted advice 
and assistance in furtherance of their fiduciary responsibilities[,]” then conflicts counsel will not 
be a viable solution.30 In determining whether conflicts counsel is a viable solution in such cases, 
courts often look at the type of conflicts of interest involved and how they will affect the lawyers 
fiduciary duties to its client.31 If the conflict is merely potential and does not equate to an actual 
dispute, the court is likely to find conflicts counsel a viable solution. However, if the conflict is 
an actual one then the lawyer cannot carry out its fiduciary duties to its client adequately and 
conflicts counsel cannot overcome such a deficiency.  
The court in In re WM Distribution expanded the rationale behind the majority view that 
requires an analysis of the type of conflict involved before determining whether conflicts counsel 
is an appropriate remedy.32 Conflicts counsel is not a viable solution where “[t]he extent of the 
areas of adverse interests between the two debtors, which include[d] adverse interests that [were] 
                                                
28 In re WM Distribution, 571 B.R. at 873. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 874. 
31 See In re National Liquidators, Inc., 182 B.R. 186, 192 (Bankr. S.D.Ohio 1995) (holding 
concurrent representation among creditors acceptable because “the record fail[ed] to suggest 
even the remotest possibility of the existence of any actual dispute”); In re Rockaway Bedding, 
Inc., 2007 WL 1461319, at *5 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (approving general counsel because the 
court “believe[d] that no more than a remote potential conflict [could] be found” and if such 
conflict situations should arise, separate conflicts counsel was a valid proposed solution ); In re 
Enron Corp., 2003 WL 223455, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that no conflicts were 
present “because on all relevant issues, Milbank used a separate conflicts counsel.”). 
32 In re WM Distribution, 571 B.R at 874. 
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central to their respective reorganization efforts, render[ed] it inappropriate to use of conflicts 
counsel.”33 In so holding, the court placed emphasis on the attorney client relationship and the 
fiduciary duty owed to the client by the attorney. Specifically, where the companies were so 
involved in each other’s day to day operations, counsel cannot fulfill its duty to one debtor 
without sacrificing its duty to the other debtor.34 While the potential for conflicts of interest were 
endless, there were numerous actual conflicts of interest present as well.35 Although courts find 
conflicts counsel a viable solution when the conflicts of interests involved are only potential, 
because there were actual conflicts of interest present in this case, conflicts that affected the 
firm’s fiduciary duties owed to each debtor company, conflicts counsel was not a viable solution.  
Conclusion 
When making determinations about the use of conflicts counsel, courts have to balance 
the ethical rules and regulations that bind the legal profession with the statutory regulations of 
the Bankruptcy Code.36 In an attempt to reserve resources in bankruptcy proceedings, courts will 
allow the use of conflicts counsel in litigations where the conflict of interest present is only 
potential because such potential conflicts do not affect the lawyers fiduciary duty to its client; 
however, if the conflict involves an actual dispute that affects these duties, the court will not 
allow such a solution. 
By focusing on the fiduciary duties owed by an attorney to its client, the court in In re 
WM Distribution aligned the underlying policy of subsection (c) of Section 327 with those 
underlying subsection (a), thus reinforcing the idea that these two subsections must be read 
                                                
33 Id. 
34 See id. (stating that “STM and WM Distribution need separate counsel to advise the companies 
as to what is in the best interest of each company regarding their continuing business relationship 
so each company can best formulate its chapter 11 plan.”). 
35 See id. at 871. 
36 See Rotunda, Resolving Client Conflicts by Hiring “Conflicts Counsel” at 697. 
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together. Although counsel may overcome a disqualification based on a conflict of interest, the 
method to do so is limited. The use of independent conflicts counsel will not be available when 
the adverse interest of the parties are fundamental to their reorganization efforts.  
 
 
